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Abstract 
Social health insurance systems can be designed with different levels of state in-
volvement and varying degrees of redistribution. In this article we focus on citi-
zens’ preferences regarding the design of their health insurance coverage includ-
ing the extent of redistribution. Using a microeconomic model we hypothesize 
that the individual’s preferred options are determined by the relative income posi-
tion and the relative risk of falling ill. Only individuals who expect to realize a net 
profit through the implicit redistributive transfers will favour a public insurance 
coverage over a private one. We test this hypothesis empirically using three dis-
tinct approaches. The first two are based on survey questions focusing on the type 
of coverage and the degree of redistribution respectively. The third is based on a 
discrete choice experiment thus accounting for trade-offs and budget constraints. 
The data is from a representative sample of 1.538 German individuals who were 
surveyed and participated in the DCE in early 2012. We find that the model has to 
be rejected. There is a wide consensus that redistributive elements should be an 
integral part of the social health insurance system and could even be extended. 
However, there are also preferences for health insurance coverage that can be in-
dividually optimized. 
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1 Introduction 
Insuring the risk of illness is fundamental for individuals. Therefore, all industrialized coun-
tries have found ways to ensure that anybody does have access to at least basic health care 
services if needed. However, the degree to which the risk of illness is socialized varies sub-
stantially. While for example in the UK all expenditures of the National Health Service are 
financed through general tax revenues, in Switzerland it is first of all each individual’s own 
responsibility to pay for health insurance. Public subsidies are only granted when needed. In 
consequence, across countries the degree of redistribution that is triggered through the design 
of the respective health insurance system varies substantially. In Germany, as in many other 
countries, scarce funding is a ubiquitous topic in health care financing. Thus, politicians won-
der on a regular basis if the budget should be increased by funneling more tax money into the 
system or if the individuals should rather bear a higher burden directly by themselves. Citi-
zens have the means to accelerate reforms but also to deter any change to the system. As Gri-
gnon (2012, p. 666) puts it: “Even the most groundbreaking academic research and bestin-
formed public policies may have little impact if the proposed changes take for granted what 
people want rather than reflect their deeply held convictions and preferences.” This makes 
this topic also interesting from a public choice perspective.  
Standard public choice models such as the ones presented in Breyer (2001) or Kifmann 
(2005) that are based on rational, utility maximizing individuals put the focus on the ratio 
between an individual’s relative income position and an individual’s relative risk to fall ill. 
Assuming a general linear income tax and disregarding the risk of falling ill, all individuals 
with more than the average income will oppose further taxation for the purpose of redistribu-
tion, as they will be net losers of the system. They can obtain private insurance cover more 
cheaply than the public one. However, if their relative risk of falling ill is higher than their 
relative income position, they are likely to be favorable towards publicly financed insurance 
coverage implying an increase in redistribution as they might benefit irrespectively of their 
“disadvantageous” income position. So the distribution of both parameters will influence the 
outcome of a popular vote on the type of health insurance as well as on the degree to which 
redistributive elements should be incorporated. 
We want to test empirically if the proposed relationship between income, risk of illness and 
preferences for insurance type and redistribution holds. A common challenge for such tasks is 
that respondents are usually not exposed to a budget constraint and are not forced to face 
trade-offs when voicing their opinion about the goals and the quantity of redistribution. This 
is likely to lead to biased results. Our data are based on a discrete choice experiment (DCE) 
that was conducted in the field with a representative sample of more than 1,500 German indi-
viduals, thereby accounting for budget constraints and trade-offs. 
Our results are twofold. First of all, using two standard variables that are based on a question 
without budget constraint and trade-offs the data seem to support the predictions of the micro-
economic model. However, when we use data from the DCE, the results just point into the 
opposite direction. Even people who – according to the theory – should oppose public health 
insurance and the resulting higher degree of redistribution prefer an extension of the welfare 
state. These findings are robust no matter if individual or family level indicators are used. 
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In the following we first present a brief review of the literature. In section 3 the model 
sketched out above is elaborated on in more detail. Section 4 provides the background to the 
DCE, the survey and the descriptive properties of the data. Furthermore we line out the econ-
ometric models. In section 5 we present the results. Section 6 concludes with a brief discus-
sion and summary. 
2 Literature 
Literature on the peculiarities of health insurance fills whole libraries. While Cutler and 
Zeckhauser (2000) provide a succinct overview on the key topics, this field of research has 
further diversified over the past decade. Thus, a comprehensive review of the literature is be-
yond the scope of this article. As at the same time almost no literature exists that applies an 
approach similar to ours, we want to use the following paragraphs to relate our quite specific 
research question to the neighboring fields of interest, including theoretical, experimental and 
empirical perspectives. 
The theoretical grounding of our approach stems from works such as Gouveia (1997), Breyer 
(1995) and Kifmann (2005) who elaborate on different aspects of social and (supplemental) 
private health insurance from a public choice perspective. While their respective focus varies, 
they all develop their analysis from the same basic model that we apply, as explained in detail 
in section 3. On a rather abstract level their findings are that the amount of public and private 
health insurance consumed or defined in a constitutional process depends primarily on the 
characteristics risk of illness, individual income and the distribution of these parameters with-
in the society in combination with the voting mechanism in place. These results make it intui-
tive why health reforms pertaining to questions of (social) health insurance are so difficult to 
implement. Just as another example Pauly (2002) discusses the non-existence of universal 
health insurance in the US from a similar public finance and public choice perspective. How-
ever, such theoretical analyses are always prone to criticism as strong assumptions regarding 
the relevant parameters and their distribution have to be made and results are often contingent 
upon these assumptions.4 Experimental and empirical studies are needed to test the hypothe-
ses derived from theory. 
Most of the experimental evidence available relates to questions such as how much are indi-
viduals willing to pay for private health insurance and which factors determine this willing-
ness-to-pay (e.g. Buckley et al. 2012). Aspects of public choice or regarding attitudes towards 
special setups of social health insurance are usually only covered indirectly when the role of 
informal institutions, beliefs or values such as solidarity and altruism are investigated. While 
experimental data has contributed significantly to a better understanding of individual behav-
ior, the participants of these experiments are usually not representative for the general public 
and the settings are fairly abstract. This makes a transfer to real world policy advice difficult. 
Traditional empirical studies, taking advantage of observed behavior and revealed preferences 
are therefore closer to the real world. In the context of health insurance the RAND experi-
ment contributed heavily to research on topics such as the relation between health insurance 
                                                 
4 As an example see the controversy between Zweifel and Breuer (2006b), Mcguire (2006), van de Ven (2006) 
and Zweifel and Breuer (2006a) as well as the analysis by Kifmann and Roeder (2011) regarding the efficiency 
of different health insurance setups. 
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and the demand for health care (e.g. Manning et al. 1987) or demand for health insurance it-
self (e.g. Marquis and Holmer 1996). However, the focus of this experiment was primarily on 
different versions of private insurance contracts (e.g. with varying coinsurance rates) and the 
resulting implications, not so much the general design and characteristics of the (social) health 
insurance system. 
There are other studies such as the ones by Sudit (1988) and Martinussen (2008) that are clos-
er to our aim by investigating attitudes – in their case the attitudes of medical students and 
professionals respectively – towards the welfare state and national health insurance. They find 
that ideology as well as self-interest are significant determinants of these attitudes. However, 
self-interest is not necessarily in all cases the predominant factor. There is another group of 
articles that cover questions of preferences with regard to health insurance, including for ex-
ample Kerssens and Groenewegen (2005), Zweifel et al. (2010) and Vroomen and Zweifel 
(2011). These studies try to elicit preferences by using discrete choice experiments. However, 
their focus is on the composition of health plans, i.e. the preferences regarding the services 
covered, the coinsurance and the premiums. 
The study which is closest to our topic is probably the one by Loh et al. (2012). The authors 
analyze in a cross country study which type of health insurance system citizens would choose 
if they were given the opportunity to decide. They develop a construct to capture the attitude 
towards social health insurance on the basis of a number of different survey questions that 
relate to attitudes towards taxation, government, businesses, insurance etc. The results indi-
cate that compared to citizens from China and the United States German citizens have the 
strongest attitude towards social health insurance. However, the sample consists only of uni-
versity students, which limits representativeness of the results. Furthermore, due to the chosen 
approach the study lacks a clear theoretical grounding for two reasons: Firstly, no underlying 
theory of the decision making process is defined. Secondly, attitudes do not reflect trade-offs 
and budget constraints which makes them only in part useful for the derivation of policy im-
plications. Nevertheless, the study by Loh et al. (2012) serves as a starting point for our anal-
yses. As German citizens exhibit a strong attitude towards social health insurance, we aim at 
investigating the determinants that constitute these attitudes and preferences. 
In this paper we want to contribute to the existing literature through a rigorous theory based 
approach complemented by an empirical strategy that is consistent with micro-economic theo-
ry and allows investigating citizens’ preferences regarding the design of health insurance sys-
tems. 
3 The Model  
Health care financing in Germany as well as in most countries of the EU is characterized by 
considerable parts of income redistribution (see Breyer and Haufler 2000). The redistributive 
character typically results from income related contributions and need based levels of bene-
fits. This implies redistribution from high income individuals to the poor and redistribution 
from the healthy individuals to the sick. As these are the dominant redistribution channels and 
key characteristics of social health insurance, they should also be decisive for utility maximiz-
ing, rational individuals when voting on the design of a specific health insurance system. 
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Accordingly, from a public choice perspective, individuals’ income position and health status 
are of particular importance, because these two components might influence individuals’ vot-
ing behavior and in consequence the extent of public spending for health care. These consid-
erations are the basis of the microeconomic models presented by Kifmann (2005) or Breyer 
(2001) which build on the works of Gouveia (1997), Epple and Romano (1996) and Breyer 
(1995). The models analyze determinants that influence the size of the public health insurance 
system. In this paper we use a specific part of these models to test whether the proposed rela-
tionship between income, risk of illness and preferences for insurance type and redistribution 
holds. 
Within this framework (see Kifmann 2005, p. 285; Breyer 2001, pp. 2–5), individuals only 
differ with respect to market income y and the probability to fall ill p.5 Each individual can 
only consume two different – homogeneous – goods: medical care h and consumption good c. 
Medical care h is the sum of private medical consumption m and the level of publicly provid-
ed medical care g. Consequently, individuals’ utility is given by: 
(3.1) ( ) * ( ).U u c p v h   
The utility from medical care v(h) is only relevant if the individual falls ill.6 Public spending 
for medical care g is financed via a linear tax schedule τ(y). Thus, an individual’s contribution 
to the health care budget amounts to τ(y)=βy, with the tax rate β. When voting for a specific 
health insurance system, each individual takes his personal income-health ratio into account. 
That is, the ratio of his own contribution in relation to the average contribution of the popula-
tion y/ݕത and his own risk of illness compared to the average risk of illness in the population 
p/݌̅. Hence, individuals’ relative income-health ratio can be written as (see Kifmann 2005, 
p. 289; Breyer 2001, p. 5): 
(3.2) ( , ) .y yT y p
p p
  
The government’s budget constraint can be obtained by: 
(3.3) with .cg p y
h
     
On the left side, government’s spending are determined by the quantity of state provided med-
ical care g, average risk of illness within the society ݌̅ and the price-ratio γ. These expendi-
tures are financed by taxes. In equilibrium the expenditures must be equal to the average con-
tributions, i.e. βݕത. 
Thus, the optimal size of governments provision of medical care g* for individual i with char-
acteristics (y,p) is given by (see Gouveia 1997, p. 232; Breyer 2001, p. 4): 
                                                 
5 There exists a continuum of individuals. Market income y and the probability to fall ill p are exogenous and 
observable. Moreover, the model abstains from incorporating the effects of taxation, moral hazard and adverse 
selection (see Breyer 2001, p. 2). 
6 Both components of individuals’ utility are increasing and concave. 
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(3.4) 
[ ( , ) ; , ] if ( , ) 1
*( , )
0 otherwise.
  
H T y p y p T y p
g y p  
In this case, H(∙) describes an individual’s demand function for medical services in the state of 
illness and T(∙) an individual’s income-health ratio. The interpretation of (3.4) is as follows: 
In case of illness, a rational, utility maximizing individual will opt for an positive optimal 
state provided level of medical care g* if his individual income-health ratio is smaller than or 
equal to one (see Kifmann 2005, p. 289). This is because this individual will benefit from the 
redistribution that is inherent within the social health insurance. From an individual perspec-
tive, he is a net winner of this system and has a strong incentive to expand the level of state 
provided medical care g. On the contrary, individuals with an income-health ratio greater than 
one are net losers of a redistributive health care system and will receive private insurance m 
more cheaply than state provided. Therefore, these individuals will oppose publicly provided 
health insurance. 
According to this result, we aim to test the following hypothesis: Do individuals with an in-
come-health ratio greater than one oppose state provided health insurance and does this be-
havior go along with a lower preference for redistribution? 
4 Empirical Strategy  
4.1 Conceptional Framework 
While the income-health indicator is rather straight forward to calculate, the component which 
is supposed to capture the preference for public or private provision of insurance is not as 
easy to define. The question should not refer to a particular existing private or public insur-
ance, as personal experiences or other confounding factors which are of no concern for the 
question at hand might influence the results. At the same time the redistributive aspect that is 
implicitly inherent in a public insurance coverage should be clear to the participants. In total 
we use three approaches to test if the proposed relationship between income, risk of illness 
and preferences for type of health insurance coverage and the implicit levels of redistribution 
holds. 
The first one tries to bear a rather close resemblance to the microeconomic model. The ap-
proach uses a typical survey question which allows participants to voice their opinion on a 
specific topic. The respondents are asked if they thought that health insurance should provide 
optimal coverage for their individual risk of illness or if health insurance should rather pro-
vide an equal basic coverage for everybody. Rather than using the connoted terms private and 
public the question tries to capture the essence of both types. The degree of redistribution is 
only implicitly built into the question. As outlined in more detail in section 4.3, a standard 
probit approach is applied to test the relationship between this variable and the income-health 
indicator.  
The second approach is very similar to the first one. In this case the individuals were asked if 
they thought that the government should spend much more, a little bit more, just the same, a 
little bit less or much less for the sick. This puts the focus on the redistributive component. 
Referring to the microeconomic model this question is used as a proxy if the individual would 
rather favor public or private health insurance coverage. This is plausible as according to the 
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theory it is only the implicit redistribution inherent in a public insurance system which makes 
it appealing to individuals with an income-health indicator of less than one. 
However, there is doubt that any of the two questions can provide valid results. Respondents 
tend to be more generous in granting subsidies to others as long as they do not have to bear 
the burden of financing it. And as long as there is no limited budget that they have to allocate 
to different groups of beneficiaries – e.g. the sick vs. the poor vs. the unemployed – they are 
not forced to prioritize between competing interests. Neither a budget constraint nor such 
trade-offs can be captured by such straight forward survey questions. 
For this reason the third approach tries to mitigate these concerns by using a study design 
which forces respondents in a quasi-experimental setting to make choices between different 
scenarios. These scenarios are presented in the context of a discrete choice experiment (DCE). 
While typical survey questions are limited to decisions on separate topics, DCEs in the con-
trary offer the possibility to model a simultaneous choice of social benefits and their respec-
tive contributions. DCEs are frequently used in market research to evaluate consumers’ pref-
erences regarding characteristics of a specific good or product. In our context – as we will 
elaborate in more detail later on – the good is a redistribution scheme with the sick as one 
potential group of beneficiaries. 
The DCE method is based on a characteristics approach which has its theoretical underpin-
ning in the new demand theory of Lancaster (1966). Individuals taking part in a DCE have to 
decide for one out of two (or sometimes more) alternatives. Each alternative, i.e. each good, 
encompasses the relevant attributes – i.e. the characteristics defining the good – as well as the 
desired attribute levels – i.e. the quantity of each attribute – that affect the utility of the con-
sumer (see Louviere and Street 2000, p. 2). The definition of the alternatives presented to the 
respondent is crucial, as it allows implementing trade-offs, i.e. an alternative can only have a 
higher level of a specific attribute on the expense of one or some other attributes. Further-
more, including the price as one attribute imposes the budget constraint. 
A utility maximizing individual will always choose the alternative with the highest utility. 
Thus, an individual will only choose a given alternative l if the utility derived from this alter-
native exceeds the utility derived from another alternative j (see Ben-Akiva and Lermann 
1985, p. 57; Louviere and Street 2000, p. 62). 
(4.1) ( , , , ) ( , , , )  .il ij l l l i i j j j i iV V v p b y s v p b y s j l      
with the indirect utility function of individual i, vi. The utility function consists of the price of 
the respective alternative pl, the attributes bl, the individual’s income yi and his socio-
demographic characteristics si.  
In the course of the experiment, each respondent has to make repeated choices between the 
status quo and varying alternatives, which allows estimating the individual indifference curve. 
In this context it is very important that the individual is driven to “jump forth and back” be-
tween the different alternatives indicating a higher or lower utility level (see Zweifel et al. 
2010, p. 4). As the estimated parameters of the indirect utility function reflect the marginal 
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utilities of the respective attributes, the ,n mMRS  is given by (see Lancsar et al. 2007, 
p. 1741):7 
(4.2) 
     
ˆ( , , , )/ .ˆ( , , , )/
mm
n
n
l l l i i m bb
b l l l i i n b
v p b y s bMRS
v p b y s b

  
Furthermore, if we substitute nb  by the price attribute lp  the MRS can be interpreted as 
marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP).8 That is the MWTP of individual i for an additional 
unit of nb  expressed in units of individuals’ income. We will refer to this measure of prefer-
ences in section 5. 
The observed choices of each individual during the experiment constitute the data basis for 
the following econometric analysis. As we cannot directly observe individuals’ utility, we 
have to treat this utility as latent construct. Thus, the indirect utility function of individual i is 
extended by an error term ilε  which is due to the fact that there are clearly attributes or mo-
tives that cannot be observed but are nevertheless important for individuals’ decision making. 
According to the Random Utility Theory (see McFadden 1974; 1981 and Manski 1977) the 
utility function is stochastic and additively split in a deterministic observable part ( )lw   and a 
stochastic component ilε : 
(4.3)       ( , , , ) ( , , , )  .il ij l l l i i il j j j i i ijV V w p b y s w p b y s j l   
Therefore, we can only estimate the probability ilP  of individual i choosing alternative l rather 
than j (see Louviere and Street 2000, p. 53). 
4.2 Implementation and Survey Design 
As redistribution is no typical consumer good and respondents have to make hypothetical de-
cisions about a rather abstract concept, the design of the DCE requires special attention. In 
this case, the underlying experimental design was carefully developed according to the proce-
dure presented in Bateman et al. (2002, p. 258). As only those attributes affecting the utility of 
individuals and having an impact on decision making should be considered, we identified a 
set of ten attributes. Altogether, we define personal tax and social insurance contributions, the 
amount of redistribution as percentage of the GDP, the socio-demographic status of benefi-
ciaries (sick persons and persons in need of care, families with children, retirees, unemployed, 
working poor) as well as the nationality of recipients (German, West-European, other) as rel-
evant attributes. These are grouped together in four diagrams that make the substitutive char-
acter and the inherent trade-offs explicit (see appendix, figure A.1). 
  
                                                 
7 In this case a linear utility function is assumed. If we consider a nonlinear utility function the calculation is 
straightforward. 
8 The price parameter can be interpreted as the marginal utility of income with the help of Roy’s Identity. For a 
formal proof see Hanemann (1983, p. 544) or Telser (2002, p. 56). 
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Table 1: Attributes, Lables and Levels 
Attribute Lable Level 
  Status quo  
Personal tax and social insurance contributions   
Tax and contribution TC 15 %  25 % 30 %  35 % 45 % 
Total amount of redistribution as percentage of GDP   
Redistribution RE 20 %  25 % 30 %  35 % 45 % 
Socio-demographic status of beneficiaries   
Retirees RI   30 % 40 %  45 %  
Sick persons and persons in need of care SP   30 % 35 %  40 %  
Unemployed UL   5 % 10 %  15 %  
Families with children FC   5 % 10 %  15 % 20 % 
Working poor WP    5 %  10 %  
Nationality of recipients   
German DE 75 %  80 % 85 %  90 %  
West-European WE    5 %  10 %  
other OT   5 % 10 %  15 %  
Source: Own calculation and visualization (see Pfarr 2013). 
In a second step, the levels of the attributes were defined. They should be sufficiently wide to 
make respondents indeed “jump” between the status quo and an alternative redistributive 
scheme. That is, respondents should be forced to overcome trade-offs (cf. Bateman et al. 
2002, p. 260; Telser 2002, p. 39). Table 1 represents the attributes and their respective levels 
defined. 
In the next steps, the design and the visual presentation of the DCE had to be considered. The 
complete factorial design – containing all possible combinations of attributes and their levels 
– results in a total of 129,600 combinations (alternatives). By using the program gosset to 
apply a D-optimal design (see Kanninen 2002, Kuhfeld et al. 1994, Kuhfeld 2006)9, we were 
able to restrict the number of alternatives to 49 and split these into seven groups.10 Each re-
spondent was confronted with only one of these groups. To control for errors in decision mak-
ing, one alternative was included twice in each of the seven groups, resulting in 8 binary 
choices per respondent. 
Further, for unbiased estimates it is necessary to ensure that all individuals have similar 
knowledge about the current status quo and that they do not underlie a misperception about 
the true state. Therefore, respondents were provided with a detailed instruction and descrip-
tion of the choice process as well as the attributes and their possible realizations.11 Finally, the 
choice experiment is complemented by a socio-demographic questionnaire covering the rele-
vant individual characteristics to test the proposed relationship between income, risk of illness 
and preferences for redistribution. 
                                                 
9 While the D-optimality was primarily developed for linear estimation models, Carson et al. (1994) suggest that 
the application for non-linear models such as probit or logit is also possible. 
10 Bech et al. (2011) show that the cognitive burden increases in the number of choice sets. Nevertheless, expos-
ing respondents up to 17 choice-sets is manageable and respondents can handle it without problems. 
11 This information is available upon request.  
9 
The choice experiment as well as the survey was conducted by computer assisted personal 
interviews in February 2012 with a total of 1,538 representatively selected individuals in 
Germany. 
4.3 Econometric Specification 
In the first part of the empirical analysis, we abstain from using the DCE and apply simple 
probit models to estimate the likelihood that an individual opts for private health insurance. In 
the second part, the DCE is used to calculate MWTP for redistribution in favor of the sick. As 
only the probability ilP  of individual i choosing alternative l rather than j can be estimated, the 
estimation equation is: 
(4.4)  
         
   
( | ) Pr[ ( ) ( )]   l,j C ;  
                ( , , , ) ( , , , ) ( ) .
il
il m ij il l j m
ij il l l l i i j j j i i il il
P l C w w j l
w p b y s w p b y s d
 
      
with il ij ilφ ε ε  .  
Therefore the probability is equal to the probability that differences between the error terms  
( ij ilε ε ) are dominated by differences in the deterministic component ( ( ) ( )l jw w   ) (see Lou-
viere and Street 2000, p. 40; Train 2009, p. 15). In line with the central limit theorem it can be 
assumed, that the error terms of eq. (4.4) are normally distributed with a mean vector of zero 
and covariance matrix Ù (Cameron and Trivedi 2008, pp. 947–951; Train 2009, p. 97). Under 
these assumptions ϕ(⋅) denotes the pdf of a standard normal distribution, i.e. a binary probit 
model. Since each respondent makes 8 decisions, panel techniques are applied. This results in 
a random effects probit model with its traditional assumptions regarding the mean, variance 
and correlation of the random effect and the conventional error term. 
The deterministic component of the utility function is typically modeled as an additive-linear 
specification (see Ben-Akiva and Lermann 1985, p. 63; Johnson and Desvousges 1997, p. 83). 
Pekelman and Sen (1979) as well as Gegax and Stanley (1997) present evidence that a quad-
ratic specification is better than a linear form of the utility function with regard to the predic-
tive power. Several specification tests and procedures have pointed to the model presented 
below to be the best with respect to goodness of fit. The current analysis aims to investigate 
individuals’ preferences for redistribution in favor of the sick. Thus, the interaction between 
the attribute redistribution and the attributes of the socio-demographic status of beneficiaries 
has to be taken into account. The attribute RE has been interacted with each of the attributes 
of the socio-demographic status of beneficiaries to express MWTP in favor of the sick. For 
example: 
(4.5)  *SP SP RE  
The estimation equation further includes a quadratic term for the attributes tax and contribu-
tion, retiree, working poor and other therefore leading to a nonlinearity of the indirect utility 
function. 
According to eq. (4.4), only utility differences in the deterministic component exhibit a rele-
vance for individual’s decision making. Therefore, individuals’ socio-demographic character-
istics will drop out as they do not vary between the decisions. To incorporate these factors and 
to allow testing the hypothesis described in section 2, interactions of individuals invariant 
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characteristics with the varying attributes are needed (see Boxall and Adamowicz 2002, 
p. 421; Johnson and Desvousges 1997, p. 83). Thus, the estimation equation is as follows: 
(4.6) 
 
        
        
2 0
2 2
1 1
Pr [ 1| ]
[ ( * )] [ ( * )]
ilj i il m p pp
K K
k k k i kk i ilk k
k k
V decision C p p
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Where δ’s reflect the parameters to be estimated, p stands for the price attribute, i.e. tax and 
contribution and bk is a vector of the remaining attributes. Individual’s characteristics are cov-
ered by the vector si. This vector consists of the proxy for individuals’ income-health ratio. 
5 Empirical Analysis 
5.1 Data 
For the following analysis, we use data from a representative cross-section survey of 1,538 
German individuals conducted in February 2012.12 The implications of the theoretical model 
in section 3 are investigated by three approaches. In all three models, an indicator for individ-
uals’ income-health ratio is regressed on a dependent binary variable. Within the first, we use 
a binary variable reflecting the insurance objective. That is, whether the individual agrees to 
the statement that health insurance should provide optimal coverage for the personal risk of 
illness (=1) or if health insurance should guarantee an equal basic coverage for everybody 
(=0). The second approach maps individuals’ income-health ratio to the extent of public 
spending for the sick. This binary variable equals one, if the individual exhibits the attitude 
that the government should spend much or a little bit more money for the sick. Finally, the 
third approach analyses the effect of individuals’ income-health ratio within the framework of 
a DCE. In this case, the dependent variable covers individuals’ decision for a specific alterna-
tive, as described above. Whereas the explanatory variables are the same for the first two ap-
proaches, the DCE consists of the attributes mentioned in section 4.2. A full description of the 
explanatory variables is presented in Table 2. 
As outlined in section 3, individuals’ income-health ratio consists of two components. The 
numerator represents the ratio between individuals’ market income and the average market 
income of the population. The denominator covers the ratio between individuals’ risk of ill-
ness and the average risk of illness within the society. We apply two versions of this indicator 
labeled Income-health indicator F an Income-health indicator I. While the character F indi-
cates a family perspective, character I concentrates on individuals. Accordingly, both indica-
tors differ with respect to the underlying variables. For the family version of the indicator, 
equivalent household net income enters the numerator. The risk of illness in the denominator 
results from the answer to the question, whether the respondent expects that somebody from 
his family falls severely ill within the next two years. In contrast, the individual specific indi-
cator is based on an individual’s gross income and self-assessed health status (SAH).13 These 
                                                 
12 For more detail about the survey design pleases refer to Pfarr (2013). 
13 The variables used to calculate the two versions of the indicator are listed in Table 2 under the heading “basis 
variables”. 
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income-health ratios are transformed into two binary variables. For both specifications, the 
income-health indicator equals one if the ratio is larger than one and zero otherwise. 
A set of twelve socioeconomic variables are included in the first two models. In addition to 
the age and the gender of a respondent, the variables cover educational level, the number of 
children as well as the nationality. 
Table 2: Variable description 
variable name label 
Dependent Variables  
Insurance objective 
1 = Health insurance should provide optimal coverage for my 
personal risk of illness 
0 = Health insurance should guarantee an equal basic coverage 
for everybody 
Public spending 
Should the government spend less or more money for the sick? 
1 = much or a little bit more 
0 = leave it as it is, a little bit or much less 
Income-health indicator F 1 = the ratio on the basis of the relative HH income and the rela-tive ROI is larger than one 
Income-health indicator I 1 = the ratio on the basis of the relative individual income and the relative SAH is larger than one 
Basis variables  
HH income Equivalent household net income in Euros 
Individual income Gross personal income in Euros (wages or pensions) 
ROI 
Risk of illness: How likely is it that somebody from your family 
falls severely ill within the next two years? 
1 = very unlikely 
to 
5 = very likely 
SAH 
Would you say that your health status is 
1 = very good 
2 = good 
3 = ok 
4 = bad 
5 = very bad 
Socioeconomic variables  
Age Age in years 
Age squared Age in years squared 
Female 1 = Female 
Elementary school 1 = Highest level of education / degree is elementary school 
Secondary school 1 = Highest level of education / degree is secondary school 
Vocational training 1 = Highest level of education / degree is vocational training 
A-Levels 1 = Highest level of education / degree is A-Levels 
University degree 1 = Highest level of education / degree is a university degree 
One child 1 = One child 
Two or three children 1 = Two or three children 
Four or more children 1 = Four or more children 
German nationality 1 = German nationality 
Source: Own visualization. 
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The summary statistics are presented in Table 3. Overall, the dataset consists of 1,538 indi-
viduals apart from the estimations that include the two income variables HH income and Indi-
vidual income. These variables are typically prone to missing values; however the share of 
missing values is – compared to other surveys – relatively small within this dataset (see Essig 
and Winter 2009). Apart from the variables age and age squared, all other independent varia-
bles are binary. Regarding the dependent variable of the first model, insurance objective, 
55 % of the respondents agree with the statement, that health insurance should provide opti-
mal coverage for the personal risk of illness. That is, a majority of German citizens is inclined 
to vote for a private health insurance. Regarding our second dependent variable public spend-
ing, more than 70 % of the respondents think, that the government should spend much or a 
little bit more money for the sick. This figure provides an initial hint, that German citizens 
exhibit a strong preference for redistribution in favor of the sick. It’s interesting to see that the 
mean as well as the standard deviation of both versions of the income-health indicator are 
equal. Thus, for 44 % of the respondents the respective indicator takes on the value one. From 
a public choice perspective this figure indicates that public health insurance would be the 
choice of a majority of German citizens as long as the median voter is decisive. 
With a closer look at the variables used to calculate the two indicators we also see a right-
skewed distribution of household income and individual income.  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Median SD
Dependent Variables    
Insurance objective 1538 0.55 1.00 0.50
Public spending 1513 0.72 1.00 0.42
Income-health indicator F 1306 0.44 0.00 0.50
Income-health indicator I 1373 0.44 0.00 0.50
Basis variables   
HH income 1306 1731.40 1590.99 967.82
Individual income 1373 1775.21 1500.00 1869.68
ROI 1538 2.74 3.00 0.96
SAH 1538 2.24 2.00 0.84
Socioeconomic variables   
Age 1538 49.55 50.00 16.52
Age squared 1538 2727.72 2500.00 1657.33
Female 1538 0.51 1.00 0.50
Elementary school 1538 0.22 0.00 0.42
Secondary school 1538 0.30 0.00 0.46
Vocational training 1538 0.21 0.00 0.40
A-Levels 1538 0.12 0.00 0.33
University degree 1538 0.14 0.00 0.35
One child 1538 0.24 0.00 0.43
Two or three children 1538 0.39 0.00 0.49
Four or more children 1538 0.03 0.00 0.17
German nationality 1538 0.97 1.00 0.16
Source: Own calculation. 
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5.2 Results 
In the following we present the results for all three approaches. Table 4 provides the estimates 
for the dependent variable insurance objective which tries to bear a rather close resemblance 
to the microeconomic model. We use two specifications of the income-health indicator: the 
family perspective F and the individual perspective I. In both cases, the coefficient is positive 
and significant at the 5 % level. This means that – in line with the microeconomic model – 
individuals with an income-health ratio larger than one are more likely to favor an insurance 
system that offers optimal protection of the individuals’ health risk. Following the logic of the 
model this is intuitive as these individuals are able to obtain private health insurance coverage 
more cheaply than the public one. They would be net payers within the redistribution system. 
We control for a number of socio-demographic variables, none of which does have a signifi-
cant impact on the choice between public or private health insurance coverage. 
Table 4: Results of the probit models for insurance objective 
 Insurance objective  Insurance objective 
 Coeff. |z|-value  Coeff. |z|-value 
Income-health indicator F 0.1595 2.19**     
Income-health indicator I   0.1896 2.51 ** 
Age -0.0095 -0.71   -0.0135 -1.04 
Age squared 0.0001 0.94   0.0001 1.35 
Female -0.0643 -0.90   -0.0596 -0.83 
Elementary school 0.3571 1.08   0.4625 1.44 
Secondary school 0.3224 0.99   0.3659 1.15 
Vocational training 0.2155 0.65   0.2354 0.73 
A-Levels 0.3509 1.05   0.4069 1.26 
University degree 0.0466 0.14   0.0962 0.29 
One child -0.0867 -0.87   -0.0919 -0.93 
Two or three children -0.1200 -1.26   -0.1043 -1.11 
Four or more children -0.2526 -1.22   -0.2218 -1.08 
German nationality -0.1875 -0.87   -0.1803 -0.84 
Constant 0.2083 0.45   0.1937 0.43 
LL Model -889.07    -932.20  
LR-Test 21.33**   26.07 ** 
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.012    0.014  
N 1,306   1,373   
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01      
Source: Own calculation. 
The second approach makes the redistributive aspect explicit. Respondents were asked if the 
government should increase the spending for the ill. This is captured in the dependent binary 
variable public spending. The results of the probit models for both versions of the income-
health indicator are presented in Table 5. Again, the results for the family perspective and the 
individual perspective are very similar. Seemingly in line with the prediction of the microeco-
nomic model, both coefficients are negative and significant at the 1% and 5% level respec-
tively. The negative sign indicates that people with a comparatively high relative income in 
relation to their relative risk of illness do not favor a higher degree of public spending in favor 
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for the sick. The intuition is that individuals for whom the indicator variable is one do not 
profit from the implicit redistribution inherent in public spending and therefore reject it. 
Table 5: Results of the probit models for public spending 
 Public spending  Public spending 
 Coeff. |z|-value  Coeff. |z|-value 
Income-health indicator F -0.2743 -3.50 ***     
Income-health indicator I   -0.2047 -2.533 ** 
Age -0.0002 -0.015   -0.0029 -0.206  
Age squared 0.0001 0.418   0.0001 0.541  
Female 0.1716 2.207 **  0.1821 2.351 ** 
Elementary school -0.9282 -1.768 *  -0.5612 -1.338  
Secondary school -0.8053 -1.539   -0.4698 -1.126  
Vocational training -0.7608 -1.449   -0.4233 -1.008  
A-Levels -0.7244 -1.371   -0.3605 -0.853  
University degree -0.7379 -1.393   -0.3985 -0.934  
One child -0.0413 -0.380   -0.0320 -0.303  
Two or three children -0.0592 -0.572   -0.0281 -0.278  
Four or more children 0.2160 0.907   0.2661 1.124  
German nationality -0.7634 -2.437 **  -0.5898 -2.075 ** 
Constant 2.0758 3.123 ***  1.5864 2.823 *** 
LL Model -729.17    -775.47 
LR-Test 37.85***   30.71 *** 
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.025    0.019 
N 1,290 1,353   
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01      
Source: Own calculation. 
However, this interpretation – focusing only on the relative difference of the attitude towards 
redistribution between the two groups – disregards the constant, which is positive and highly 
significant. This means for the family perspective that if all predictors are evaluated at zero 
the predicted probability for a favorable attitude towards an increase in public spending in 
favor of the sick is extremely high at about 98 %. Setting the predictor German nationality 
equal one and all others equal to zero the predicted probability is still around 90 %. And if 
additionally the income-health indicator F is set one, the predicted probability is still around 
85 %. The results for the individual perspective are very similar. Evaluating all predictors at 
zero the predicted probability is 94 %, setting German nationality equal to one 84 %. Howev-
er, even with the income-health indicator I the predicted probability is still well over 78 %. 
This means that strictly speaking the model has to be rejected, as it implies that individuals 
with an income-health indicator equal to one would oppose any redistributive aspect in the 
health insurance system.  
Turning to the third approach one must be aware that the data is now not the result of a survey 
question which asks the respondents to voice their opinion. The data are the outcome of a 
DCE in which the respondents were forced to overcome trade-offs when allocating resources 
to different groups of potential beneficiaries. Furthermore, a price tag was added to the bene-
15 
fits they granted. Similar to the second approach, the whole setup puts the redistributive as-
pect in the focus. 
To allow for a meaningful interpretation of the results of the third approach, we have to con-
vert the results into the MWTP. In this case, the MWTP – measured in percentage points of 
the individual’s income – is calculated for an increase of one percentage point of the redistri-
bution in favor of the sick. Surprisingly we find that no matter which of the two indicators is 
used both groups – individuals with an income-health indicator equal one and individuals 
with an income-health indicator equal zero – do have a positive MWTP for an increased level 
of public spending in the health insurance system (see table 6). Although at the first glance 
there seems to be a difference between the two estimates from the family perspective, tests 
indicate that these differences are not significant. Looking at the individual perspective, the 
estimates are basically identical for both groups. 
Table 6: Marginal willingness-to-pay for redistribution 
 Redistribution in favor of the sick 
 MWTP MWTP  
Income-health indicator F = 1 0.7682 ***   
Income-health indicator F = 0 0.3379 *   
Income-health indicator I = 1  0,4923 *** 
Income-health indicator I = 0  0,4932 *** 
N 10,448  10,984  
LL -5,982  -6,284  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Standard errors were calculated with the help of the delta-method. 
Source: Own calculation. 
The results of the third approach provide even less support of the microeconomic model than 
the results of the second approach. Now, not even a relative tendency can be identified. 
6 Discussion and concluding remarks 
Taken together, these results seem to be a little bit puzzling. While the first approach supports 
the microeconomic model, the second approach creates doubts and the third approach outright 
rejects the model. However, we do argue that the overall picture is consistent. 
The first question did not focus on the redistributive component but rather on the type of 
health insurance coverage. One could rephrase the question and ask: Should the system allow 
customizing the coverage so that the individual risk is optimally covered? Individuals with an 
income-health indicator equal to one are significantly more inclined to favor optimal individ-
ual coverage. At the same time, this group of people is in favor of redistributive elements in 
the health insurance system and would even support an extension of this component. Thus, 
although this group would rather customize their insurance package and are not in favor of a 
one-size-fits-all basic coverage, to them redistributive elements are an integral part to any 
form of health insurance coverage. 
The model is not able to capture the reasoning behind these attitudes and preferences and has 
to be extended. At this point we cannot say if ethical, altruistic or more complex self-interest 
driven factors are decisive and should be taken into account. This warrants further research. 
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But the results provide some more insights that might be interesting from a public choice per-
spective. Looking at the median voter one can see from the descriptive statistics that for the 
majority of people the income-health indicator equals zero. This means that for the majority 
of people a basic and equal health care coverage seems to be favorable. Furthermore, they 
would support a further extension of the redistributive elements. The latter seems to be a ra-
ther broad consensus across various subgroups. Looking at the results of the third approach – 
which is grounded in microeconomic theory, captures trade-offs and budget constraints –
individuals with an income-health indicator equal to one do not have a lower MWTP – i.e. 
preference – for additional redistribution in favor of the sick. 
There seem to be two core messages for policy makers. First, the health insurance coverage 
should be founded on strong principals of solidarity. There is a wide consensus in the society 
that redistributive elements are necessary. Second, there is also a large group who would pre-
fer insurance coverage that is better tailored to their individual need. Thereby the principles of 
solidarity and redistribution are not questioned at all. Thus the goal of policy makers might be 
to build health care coverage that in its essence provides an equal basic coverage to everybody 
but allows for some flexible components to individualize the package according to the indi-
vidual’s needs. Another option could be what Pauly (2002, pp. 360–364) describes as means 
tested insurance: Individuals up to a certain income ceiling a required to become members of 
the social health insurance. The nonpoor people have to finance the redistributive component 
via taxes but are free to choose any form of insurance that they want. From a distributional 
perspective this leads to the same results as a social health insurance approach. At the same 
time the system can accommodate different preferences regarding the extent and type of in-
surance consumed by the nonpoor. 
The investigation presented in this paper is subject to some limitations. First, only the effect 
of one specific factor was analyzed. Future research should also consider determinants such as 
risk aversion, altruism and culture. Second, survey data always refer to a point of time and 
cover the current economic and social situation in the country in which the survey was admin-
istered. 
Based on a microeconomic model the aim of this paper is to test the relationship between in-
come, risk of illness and preferences for insurance type and redistribution. Using three differ-
ent approaches with slightly different perspectives on the same question we obtained various 
interesting results. First of all, the model in its current form has to be rejected. Even individu-
als for whom – according to the model – health insurance coverage with redistributive com-
ponents is unfavorable do not reject this but are rather strongly in favor of redistributive com-
ponents. This group even exhibits a positive MWTP to increase the current level of redistribu-
tion in favor of the sick. This result is however in line with the theoretical implications of 
Kifmann (2005), who predicts that a redistributive social health insurance might be supported 
by the majority of the population – i.e. also the very rich and healthy individuals – as long as 
insurance markets are incomplete and individuals are not able to buy insurance against premi-
um risks. Nonetheless, this group does have a preference for health insurance coverage that 
fits better with the individual risk. 
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